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. Introduction
Like everyone else, economists like to break out of the narrowness of
their discipline and speculate on a larger theme, painting on a bigger canvas.
Like John Kenneth Galbraith, they may even make money while having fun. In
the process, they may even illuminate and inform, doing good while doing well.
The task I have been assigned is an intellectually challenging one: does
the growing globalization of the world economy and the presumed growth then
in interdependence promise to constrain national sovereignty; and, does it
equally threaten to compromise democratic accountability within nation states?
I feel daunted by the task : it is both extremely broad in scope and at the
same time inadequately amenable to conventional analysis within any
discipline. My analysis, while grounded in my understanding of the
globalization process that is ongoing, must therefore remain essentially
speculative in character. Few such speculations, especially those that contain
within them a prognosis of the future, have turned out, if the past is any guide, to
stand the test of time (though, I derive comfort from the fact that the worth of an
idea lies in what it stimulates, even if by provocation, even while it is itself wildly
wrong).
Since a major element of the globalization process today is international
trade and since we economists tend to think of international trade as essentially
a technology (in the sense that it adds to one's productive potential yet another
way of transforming goods into one another, via external exchange), the great
failure of such speculation that comes to mind, of course, is that of the
celebrated pessimists George Orwell and Aldous Huxley. The authors of 1984
and the Brave New World imagined modern technology as the enemy of
freedom and the unwitting tool of authoritarianism; things however turned out for
the better, not worse. Modern technology was supposed to make Big Brother
omnipotent, watching you into submission; instead, it enabled us to watch Big
Brother into impotence. Faxes, video cassettes, CNN have plagued and
paralyzed dictators and tyrants, accelerating the disintegration of their rule. As a
wit has remarked, the PC (personal computer) has been the deathknell of the
CP (communist party).1
But closer to home, both to me and to the broader theme of this
Conference, has been the failure of the early intellectual thinking on the
relationship of democracy to development.2 Thus, when reflection on strategies
for the newly liberated countries began in the 1950s, there was considerable
skepticism about the ability of democracies to compete in the race against
totalitarian regimes. In fact, it seemed evident that democratic ideas and
countries were fated to suffer a disadvantage in this contest. To understand
why, it is necessary to recollect the mind-set at the root of the conception of
development that then prevailed.
The Harrod-Domar model, much used then, analyzed development in
terms of two parameters: the rate of investment and the productivity of capital.
For policy-making purposes, the latter was largely treated as "given," so debate
centered on the question of how to promote investment. This approach favored
by mainstream economists coincided with the Marxist focus on "primitive
accumulation" as the mainspring of industrialization and also with the
cumbersome quasi-Marxist models elaborated in the investment-allocation
11n Huxley's instance, the irony is greater still when one contemplates that mescalin was seen
by him as opening the doors of perception when today its progeny, LSD et. al, are seen as
closing these doors.
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For a short commentary on this question, see my "Democracy and Development", Journal of
Democracy. July 1992, pp.37-44, and, in particular, see the extended analysis in my First Rajiv
Gandhi Memorial Lecture, "Democracy and Development", delivered on October 22, 1995 in New
Delhi and being published in Journal of Democracy. October 1995.
literature that grew up around Maurice Dobb.
But if the focus was on accumulation, with productivity considered a
datum, it was evident that democracies would be handicapped vis-a-vis
totalitarian regimes. Writing in the mid-1960's, I noted "the cruel choice
between rapid (self-sustained) expansion and democratic processes."3 This
view, which the political scientist Atul Kohli has christened the "cruel choice"
thesis, was widely shared by economists at the time.4 Later emphasis would
shift away from raising the rate of savings and investment (dimensions on which
most developing countries did well) to getting the most for one's blood, sweat,
and tears (dimensions on which developing countries performed in diverse
ways). Indeed, by the 1980s it was manifest that the policy framework
determining the productivity of investment was absolutely critical, and that
winners and losers would be sorted out by the choices they made in this regard.
Democracy then no longer looked so bad: it could provide better incentives,
relate development to people, and offset any accumulationist disadvantage that
it might produce. Indeed, as Kohli has emphasized, the growth rates of
democracies have not been noticeably worse than those of undemocratic
regimes.5
I also think that the common view, that the undemocratic nature of the
regimes in South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Hong Kong was the key to
their phenomenal growth, is false. This is a non sequitur, a choice example of
3
 Jagdish Bhagwati, The Economics of Underdeveloped Countries (London and New York:
Weidenfeld and Nicholson and McGraw Hill, 1966), 204.
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 Cf. Atul Kohli, "Democracy and Development," in John P. Lewis and Valeriana Kallab, eds.,
Development Strategies Reconsidered (Washington, D.C.: Overseas Development Council,
1986), 155.
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 Ibid. This conclusion is certainly not refuted by the more intensively statistical papers in this
volume on this subject. While Surjit Bhalla appears to deduce that "political freedom", or
democracy, has a benign influence on growth, Przeworksi and Limongi are more skeptical of this
benign relationship. Neither concludes however, as the cruel-dilemma thesis did, that democracy
harms growth.
the post hoc ergo propter hoc fallacy. These regimes owe their phenomenal
success to their rapid transition to an export-oriented trade strategy (which first
enabled them to profit from the unprecedented growth in the world economy
through the 1960s, and then positioned them to continue as major competitors
in world markets)6 , as well as to their high rates of literacy (which economists
now generally acknowledge to be an important "producer good"). Both of these
growth-promoters were present in part because of the geographic proximity of
Japan and the power of its example.
Similarly, I would argue that the dismal performance of India owed to her
poor choice of developmental strategy, with excessive reliance on import
substitution and degeneration into mindless bureaucratic controls, as also low
rates of literacy (whose roots lie in social and political factors discussed
insightfully by the political scientist, Myron Weiner in his recent book7 ), the
former failing to be blamed in large part on the intellectual affinity that its
governing classes harbored for both Fabian politics and Cambridge
economics.8
East Asian authoritarianism and Indian democracy are thus not the key to
explaining their relative performance: the proponents of the contention that
democracy aids, or at minimum does not hamper development, have little to fear
from the comparative performance of these two regions.
Clearly, then, the "cruel choice" thesis was wrong; and, for us who value
6
 The question of the reasons for the East Asian "miracle" have been subject of much
controversy among economists recently. My own view, developed in many writings, is that their
external orientation since the late 1950s enabled these countries to raise their investment and
hence saving rates to phenomenally high levels, while the high export earnings and high
investment rates meant that imports of new-technology-embodying capital goods also increased
dramatically, enabling these countries to profit additionally from the technological inflow.
7
 M. Weiner, The Child and the State in India: Child Labor and Education Policy in Comparative
Perspective. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1991.
8
 I have discussed the role of these intellectual antecedents, and of misplaced economic
theorizing by some of India's leading economists, on India's dismal economic performance in India
in Transition. Radhakrishnan Lectures, (1992, Oxford University) Clarendon Press, 1994.
democracy, the error hurts our ego while warming our hearts. Here we have
therefore an excellent illustration of how speculation grounded in the best
thinking of the time failed the test of time, simply because we were using the
wrong road map. I am therefore conscious, as I address the tasks before me,
that some years down the road, the reality that I seek to grasp will have proven
to be elusive again.
II. The Questions
The central questions that I will address now are:
* Is sovereignty being lost by nation states because of the
interdependence implied by the increased globalization of the world economy?
* Is there also a decline, for this and other reasons, in the democratic
accountability that national governments owe to their citizens?
Environment vs. Trade: An Illustration
These questions have acquired considerable political salience today.
They are readily illustrated, though neither in all their complexity nor with the
analytical rigour that I hope to use below, by the often-acrimonious debate
between the proponents of free trade, the GATT and the WTO, on the one hand,
and many environmentalists, on the other.
To a large extent, of course, this conflict is inevitable. It reflects partly
differences of philosophical approaches to nature that are irreconcilable.
Several environmentalists assert nature's autonomy whereas many economists
see nature as a handmaiden to mankind. The environmentalists' anguish at the
effect of human activity on the environment is beautifully captured by Gerald
Manley Hopkins when, in Binsev Poplars, he writes:
O if we but knew what we do
When we delve or hew —
Hack and rack the growing green!
Since country is so tender
To touch, her being so slender,
That, like this sleek and seeing ball
But a prick will make no eye at all,
Where we, even where we mean
To mend her we end her,
When we hew or delve:
After-comers cannot guess the beauty been.
Ten or twelve, only ten or twelve
Strokes of havoc unselve
The sweet especial scene,
Rural scene, a rural scene,
Sweet especial rural scene.
It is indeed hard to find an echo of Hopkins in the utilitarian, cost-benefit
calculus that many economists bring to bear on the question of the environment.
Then again, the conflict reflects other contrasts. Thus, trade has been
central to economic thinking since Adam Smith discovered the economic virtues
of specialization and of the markets that naturally sustain it, whereas markets
do not normally exist to protect the environment and must often be specially
created. Trade therefore suggests abstention from regulation, whereas
environmentalism suggests its necessity. In turn, trade is exploited and its
virtues extolled by corporate and multinational interests, whereas environmental
objectives are embraced typically by nonprofit organizations which are
generally wary of, if not hostile to, these interests.
In the end, however, the hostility of the environmentalists to trade and the
institutions such as the GATT that oversee it arises from precisely the two issues
posed earlier: the threat that trade, increasingly resulting from the globalization
of the world economy, poses to sovereignty and to democratic accountability.9
Let me elaborate.
Thus, concerning sovereignty, the environmentalists feel that their ability
to maintain the High Standards that they have achieved in their countries will be
constrained and eroded by free trade and free capital flows with the Low
Standard countries. Their concern is reminiscent of the classic problem of
"socialism in one state". Just as capital and labour outflows will undermine the
socialist objectives in a country going it alone, so will environmental (and
labour) standards erode if they are lower elsewhere. In economists' language,
the "political equilibrium" will shift in favour of those who oppose High
Standards as industries decline through competition with foreign rivals
operating under Low Standards. Moreover, there may ensue an inter-
jurisdictional competition to attract capital and jobs through lowering
environmental (and labour) standards, so that the trading countries may wind up
with an inferior Nash equilibrium, characterized also by lower standards in one
or all jurisdictions, than would emerge in a cooperative equilibrium.10
The environmentalists also fear the undermining of their High Standards
via the alternative route of the Low Standards countries challenging the High
Standards as "unscientific" or as "closet protectionism". In this instance, when
the High Standards are subject to such challenge at the GATT (and now, the
WTO which is replacing the GATT) by other trading nations, the
environmentalists see the problem as the second one posed above: the
9
 The threat to sovereignty was also a principal objection to signing the Uruguay Round
accords by many legislators in the two democracies, India and the United States. Ironically, the
former feared that the weak countries would lose sovereignty to the strong ones, the latter
feared that the strong countries would lose it to the weak ones.
10
 The theoretical aspects of this argument, which has attracted a huge economic literature,
have been nicely reviewed and synthesized by John Wilson is his contribution to Jagdish
Bhagwati and Robert Hudec (ed.s), Fair Trade and Harmonization: Prerequisites for Free Trade?.
Vol.s I and II, M.l.T.Press: Cambridge, forthcoming in February 1996.
undermining of democratically-enacted legislation by "faceless bureaucrats" at
the GATT. Again, they argue that "the process of negotiating international
agreements [such as the GATT's Uruguay Round of multilateral trade
negotiations, concluded in April 1995 at Marrakesh] is less subject to public
scrutiny, and therefore a threat to democratic accountability".11
In fact, some environmentalists have gone even further and alleged that
trade liberalization is in part a strategy for circumventing the health and welfare
regulations legislated democratically within the nation: the title of a celebrated
article by Walter Russell Mead in Harper's Magazine (September 1992),
embracing this thesis, is : "Bushism, Found: A Second-Term Agenda Hidden in
Trade Agreements".
Thus, the questions concerning the impact of globalization, and the
integration of one's economy into the world economy, on sovereignty and on
democratic accountability are central concerns in the political arena. A
systematic examination of these questions is manifestly necessary. I will
therefore turn to each of these questions. But, prior to doing so, I will consider
briefly the nature and extent of globalization to date.
III. Globalization
The process of globalization of the world economy has occurred on
several dimensions: trade, capital flows, human migrations (voluntary and
involuntary). I will sketch these with great brevity.
11
 This claim is quoted in Robert Hudec's excellent contribution," 'Circumventing' Democracy:
The Political Morality of Trade Negotiations", Journal of International Law and Politics, Summer
1993,. containing the Proceedings of a Conference on 'The Morality of Protectionism" at the New
York University Law School in November 1992.
Trade flows have dramatically increased in the last two decades, with
most countries doubling the share of their trade in GNP and more. The
increased trade reflects the continuing reduction of trade barriers with
successive multilateral trade negotiations and also, in the case of developing
countries, a substantial amount of unilateral, nonreciprocal trade liberalization
which can be attributed to a mix of aid-conditionality and self-enlightenment in
light of the postwar example of successful outward-oriented countries.12
A contribution to this phenomenon has also been made by the expansion
of transnational production by multinational firms to a point where many have
now made the claim that it is impossible now to say whether a product is
American or Japanese or European: a claim that is perhaps premature but
certainly destined to be validated in the near future.
The trade flows have expanded, not just in manufactures, but explosively
in services. In turn, that has meant, because services must be supplied often by
taking the provider to the user, that the trend towards foreign establishments
and (temporary) migration of skilled labour such as lawyers and accountants
has greatly accelerated.
* Investment flows have increased. True, we forget that the East India
Company and the Dutch East Indies Company dominated commerce and the
economic life of their countries, so in the long historical sweep, it is probably
untrue to talk of the increased dominance of DFI (Direct Foreign Investment).
But, in recent decades, it has certainly grown; and its composition is now more
evenly balanced between rich-to-poor and rich-to-rich countries. Much DFI
12
 This value of example has certainly worked in South America and in India, where such
unilateral trade liberalization has occurred. It would have greatly pleased Cobden and Bright,
leading lights in Britain's repeal of the Corn Laws, who were unilateral free traders and felt that the
example of British success from her Free Trade, rather than reciprocity, would effectively spread
Free Trade elsewhere. Cf. my Protectionism , MIT Press: Cambridge, 1988 (Bertil Ohlin
Lectures, 1987)
occurs now in services, partly piggybacking on manufacturing DFI from their
home country. Again, while DFI leads to trade, trade leads to DFI; the entry of
Spain into the EC triggered a substantial influx of DFI to access the EC market
and President Salinas realistically hoped for a similar bounty for Mexico from
NAFTA.
The growth of the international flow of short-term funds is perhaps the
most dramatic change in the world economy. Their staggering size and their
volatility that recently devastated Mexico is a continuing and painful reminder, of
the vulnerability that they equally bring, to the Finance Ministers and Central
Bank Chairmen and Governors of even powerful countries like France, England,
Japan and the United States.
By contrast, foreign ajd flows have continued to shrink in real terms. But
they remain important, bilaterally from the triad (the EU, USA, and Japan) and
multilaterally. [They bring explicit conditionality with them, unlike the private
funds which exact only the implicit conditionality that the task of wooing them or
else losing them implies].
*An important dimension on which countries interface has been humanity
itself. Illegal flows have become dramatic as, now that information and networks
exist, the rich countries have become targets for entry. Immigration controls
have been evaded, as controls invariably are; it is not too farfetched to say that
borders are getting to be beyond control.
The problem is compounded for the refugees, both as narrowly defined in
UN Covenants, and in terms of the wider definition of flight from civil wars and
mortal danger. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees finds her hands full
and her purse empty as the refugees have multiplied with civil wars brought
about by ethnic strife, famine and deprivation.
IV. Conventional Concerns: Benign versus Malign Impacts
Economists generally see the increasingly interdependent world, with its
growing exchange of goods and services and flows of funds to where the
returns are expected to be higher, as one that is gaining in prosperity as it is
exploiting the opportunities to trade and to invest that have been provided by
the postwar dismantling of trade barriers and obstacles to investment flows.
This is the conventional "mutual-gain" or "non-zero-sum game" view of the
situation. I would argue that it is also the appropriate one.
But it is not a view that has had a clear run at the best of times. That
integration into the world economy is a peril rather than an opportunity, that it
will produce predation at one's expense instead of gain, has never been wholly
absent from the policy scene. The substance of the disagreement among
policymakers and among mainstream economists has, however, been defined
by disagreements concerning the impact of such integration or globalization on
conventionally-defined economic welfare whereas only recently have broader
concerns about sovereignty and democratic accountability risen from the fringe
to command attention in policy circles.
An Ironic Reversal
But I must point to an irony: where the developing countries (the South)
were earlier skeptical of the benign-impact view and the developed countries
(the North) were confident of it, today the situation is the other way around.
(i) The Earlier Situation: Thus, if you look back at the 1950s and 1960s,
the contrast between the developing countries (the South) and the developed
countries (the North) was striking and made the South strongly pessimistic
about the effects of integration into the world economy while the North was
firmly optimistic instead:
* The South generally subscribed, not to the liberal, mutual-gain, benign-
impact view, but to malign-neglect and even malign-intent views of trade and
investment interactions with the world economy.13 It was feared that "integration
into the world economy would lead to disintegration of the domestic economy".
While the malign-neglect view is manifest most clearly in the famous
dependencia theory that President Cardoso of Brazil formulated in his radical
youth as Latin America's foremost sociologist, the malign-impact view was most
vividly embodied in the the concept and theory of neocolonialism.
Trade thus had to be protected; investment inflows had to be drastically
regulated and curtailed.14 The inward-oriented, import-substituting (IS) strategy
was the order of the day almost everywhere. Only the Far Eastern economies,
starting mainly in the early 1960s, shifted dramatically to an outward-oriented
policy posture: the results, attributable principally to this contrast in orientation
to the world economy but partly also to initial advantages such as inherited land
reforms and high literacy rates, were to produce the most remarkable growth
experiences of this century (and, as I shall presently argue, to facilitate by
example the reversal of the inward-looking policies in recent years). But, at the
time, the developing countries were certainly in an inward, cautious mode about
embracing the world economy.
* By contrast, the developed countries, the North15, moved steadily
13
 These different economic-philosophical positions are discussed in depth in Jagdish
Bhagwati (ed.), The New International Economic Order: The North-South Debate. Cambridge:
MIT Press, 1977, Chapter 1.
14
 This attitude extended to other areas too: the outward flow of skilled manpower was thus
considered a "brain drain" rather than an opportunity for one's citizens to train and work abroad
that would lead to a beneficial impact as this diaspora expanded.
15
 They were called the West, of course, then. The changing nomenclature of the poor and
rich countries reflects a shift from a historical, cultural and imperial divide into East and West to a
contemporary, post-colonial and development-related divide into South and North.
forward with dismantling trade barriers through the GATT Rounds, with firm
commitment to multilateralism as well, subscribing essentially to the principles
of multilateral free trade and of freer investment flows as the central guiding
principles for a liberal international economic order that would assure economic
prosperity for all participating nations.16
(ii) Role Reversal: The Turnaround: Today, however, the situation is
almost reversed. The fears of integration into the world economy are being
heard, not from the developing countries which see great good from it as they
have extensively undertaken what the GATT calls "autonomous" reductions in
their trade barriers, i.e. unilateral reductions outside the GATT context of
reciprocal reductions. Of course, not all these reductions, and increased
openness to inward DFI, have resulted from changed convictions in favour of
the liberal international economic order and its benefits to oneself, though the
failure of policies based on the old pro-inward-orientation views and the
contrasting success of the Far Eastern countries following the pro-outward-
orientation views have certainly played an important role, especially in Latin
America and Asia. But some measure of the shift must also be ascribed to
necessity resulting from the conditionality imposed by the World Bank and, at
times, by the IMF, as several debt-crisis-afflicted countries flocked to these
institutions for support in the 1980s, and equally from their own perceived need
to restore their external viability by liberal domestic and international policies
designed to reassure and attract DFI.
But if the South has moved to regard integration into the world economy
as an opportunity rather than a peril, it is the North that is now fearful. In
particular, the fear has grown, after the experience with the decline in the real
16
 See, for example, Jagdish Bhagwati, Protectionism. Bertil Ohlin Lectures, Cambridge: MIT
Press, 1988, on the question of free trade, and The World Trading System at Risk. Harry Johnson
Lecture, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991 on the issue of multilateralism.
wages of the unskilled in the United States and with their employment in
Europe in the 1970s and 1980s, that by trading with the South with its
abundance of unskilled labour, the North will find its own unskilled at risk.17 The
demand for protection that follows is then not the old and defunct "pauper-
labour" argument which asserted falsely that trade between the South and the
North could not be beneficial. Rather, it is the theoretically more defensible,
income-distributional argument that trade with countries with paupers will
produce paupers in our midst, that trade with the poor countries will produce
more poor at home.
Now, it is indeed true that the real wages of the unskilled have fallen
significantly in the United States during the previous two decades. In 1973, the
"real hourly earnings of non-supervisory workers measured in 1982 dollars
...were $8.55. By 1992 they had actually declined to $7.43 — a level that had
been achieved in the late 1960s. Had earnings increased at their earlier pace,
they would have risen by 40 percent to over $12."18 The experience in Europe
has generally been similar in spirit, with the more "inflexible" labour markets
implying that the adverse impact has been on jobs rather than on real wages.19
But the key question is whether the cause of this phenomenon is trade
with the South, as unions and many politicians feel, or rapid modern
information-based technical change that is increasingly substituting unskilled
labour with computers that need skilled rather than unskilled labour. As
always, there is debate among economists about the evidence: but the
preponderant view today among the trade experts is that the evidence for
17
 The evidence in support of this phenomenon in the 1980s , both for the United States and
for several other countries, is reviewed and synthesized nicely by Marvin Kosters in Chapter 1 of
Jagdish Bhagwati and Marvin Kosters (eds.), Trade and Wages: Leveling Wages Down?.
Washington D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1994.
18
 Cf. Robert Lawrence, "Trade, Multinationals, & Labor", Cambridge: National Bureau of
Economic Research, Working Paper No. 4836, August 1994.
19
 See Employment Outlook. Paris: OECD, July 1993.
linking trade with the South to the observed distress among the unskilled to
date is extremely thin, at best. In fact, the main study by labour experts that first
suggested otherwise has been shown to be methodologically unsound in not
appreciating that if real wages were to fall for unskilled labour due to trade with
the South, the goods prices of the unskilled-labour-intensive goods would have
to have fallen;20 and subsequent examination of the US data on prices of goods
shows that the opposite happened to be true.21 z
While therefore the consensus currently is that technical change, not
trade with the South, has immiserized our proletariat, the fear still persists that
such trade is a threat to the unskilled. In Europe, there has thus been talk of the
difficulty of competing with "Asiatic ants"; such talk leads to talk of protectionism,
in turn.
Alongside with this is the fear that multinationals will move out to take
advantage of the cheaper labour in the poor countries, as trade becomes freer,
thus adding to the pressure that trade alone, with each nation's capital at home,
brings on the real wages of the unskilled. Of course, this too is unsubstantiated
fear: but it has even greater political salience since the loss of jobs to trade is
20
 See Jagdish Bhagwati, "Free Traders and Free Immigrationists: Strangers or Friends?", New
York: Russell Sage Foundation, Working Paper No. 20, 1991.
21
 This empirical work by Robert Lawrence and Matthew Slaughter is reviewed in Jagdish
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in Bhagwati and Kosters, op.cit. A subsequent empirical study by Jeffrey Sachs and Howard
Schatz, 'Trade and Jobs in US Manufacturing" in Brookinas Papers. 1994, claims to overturn the
Lawrence-Slaughter findings by taking out computers (a procedure that is debatable at best].
Even then the coefficient with the changed sign is both small and statistically insignificant.So,
while Noam Chomsky has educated us that two negatives add up to a positive in every language, it
is wrong to claim that the two negatives of a statistically insignificant and small parameter of the
required sign add up to a positive support for the thesis that trade has been depressing the real
wages of the unskilled!
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but his arguments have been effectively criticized by Lawrence, op.cit.. 1994. See also the most
recent review of the theory and evidence in Jagdish Bhagwati, 'Trade and Wages: Choosing
Among Alternative Explanations", Federal Reserve Bank of New York Economic Policy Review.
January 1995.
less easily focused on specific competing countries and their characteristics
than when a factory shuts down and opens in a foreign country instead. As it
happens, I suspect that, at least in the United States, the flow of capital also is
in the wrong direction from the viewpoint of those who are gripped by such fear.
For, during the 1980s, the United States surely received more DFI than it sent
out elsewhere, both absolutely and relative to the 1950s and 1960s. Besides, if
foreign savings are considered instead, the 1980s saw an influx, corresponding
to the current account deficit that has bedevilled US-Japan trade relations for
sure.
The fears in the developed countries are fairly potent, nonetheless, and
drive a number of other demands, such as those for harmonizing and imposing
higher environmental and labour standards on the poor countries: not primarily
because of moral concerns reflecting a sense of transborder moral obligation
but often with a view to somehow and anyhow raising the costs of production in
the poor countries to reduce the pressure of competition that is feared to
depress one's wages and take away one's jobs. I will return to these aspects of
the question below.
V. Globalization and Sovereignty
Evidently then, I regard the foregoing critiques and fears of the
globalization process in the developed countries to be unsound, and the
reverse enthusiasm for globalization among the developing countries today to
be sensible. In fact, I embrace (with necessary nuances) the current
"Washington consensus", which I embraced in fact long before it reached
Washington, that successful and robust development requires two pillars:
democracy (whose merits I began my analysis with) and markets (which, in turn,
imply integration into the world economy).
But there are new concerns which have arisen, which cut across the rich
and poor countries and in fact afflict the latter even more pointedly, concerning
the loss of sovereignty as also of democratic accountability following the
globalization phenomenon. These are important concerns, especially since, if
integration into the world markets for trade, investment and people is
undercutting democracy, then the two legs on which the Washington
consensus seeks to walk will be pulling in different directions. These concerns
therefore need to be carefully assessed.
Let me begin with the question of sovereignty. Two different ways can be
distinguished in which this question may be approached. Both concern the poor
nations more than the rich nations, since the latter are politically and
economically the stronger.
1. Increased Cost of Certain Policy Options: One way is to consider
sovereignty as adversely affected if the globalization, while welfare-improving,
increases the cost of certain policy options so dramatically as to impair, in
effect, our ability to adopt them.
Thus, the increasing trade opportunities and flows of funds and of direct
foreign investment (DFI) in today's world economy are increasing the ability of
different countries to achieve greater income or even significantly-accelerated
growth rates. At the same time, however, the increased reliance on trade,
external funds and DFI may constrain the ability of individual nation states to
pursue social agendas.
This may happen, for instance, because the politically weaker nations
may find themselves unable to pursue more egalitarian agendas, for example,
without serious consequences such as outflows of capital. This used to be, in
fact, the problem of "socialism in one state": if you went socialist, while the world
around you was not, your capital and people would exit, forcing such immense
economic costs that the option of socialism was effectively ruled out.
Then again, to recount a more pertinent problem today, consider the
Mexican debacle in early 1995. Integration into the capital markets of the world
through capital account convertibility aided Mexico's prosperity for sure by
enabling her to gain from short-term capital inflows and by avoiding the
efficiency losses that exchange control restrictions entail. But then such
integration and openness to volatile short-term capital inflows demands
extremely difficult fiscal and monetary discipline in whose absence the
economy becomes seriously vulnerable. When things go wrong, as they did in
Mexico, putting the economy on the rack to restore credibility with Wall Street
becomes Hobson's choice: the alternatives are even worse. Policy options
shrink dramatically before and during crises.
One may well ask: if governments choose to integrate and take these
risks and corresponding constraints on their policy options, is this not a
calculated and rational surrender of sovereignty? By and large, I think that this
is a valid way to look at the question. But some observations are in order:
* Governments may not adequately grasp the full implications of
globalization when they choose to integrate in specific ways into the world
economy. Evidently the many macroeconomists, who have dominated Mexico's
recent politics, did not.
Then again, even if they did, they may overdiscount the downside
scenarios, leading to a regret phenomenon.
Unfortunately, the reversal of mistaken policies may not be easy. It is hard
to imagine that Mexico will be able to get out from under Wall Street's yoke now
that it is financially crippled thanks to embracing Wall Street with abandon.
* Besides, governments are not unitary actors. A decision to integrate, for
example, that constrains (by increasing greatly the cost of such a shift) the
ability to shift to more egalitarian policies down the road may weigh greatly on
some groups. These groups will then continue to regard and to oppose the
decisions to integrate the economy into the world economy as a surrender of
sovereignty even when the decision is taken democratically and is best seen as
a welfare-improving one.
These groups also see several recent institutional arrangements
underlying and embodying the globalization as being explicitly designed to
preempt future options to reverse the integration process. Thus, during the
NAFTA (North American Free Trade Arrangement) debate in the United States
and Mexico, the most popular argument for NAFTA's passage by the US
Congress was precisely that, once Mexico had entered NAFTA, it would
politically "lock in" Mexico's markets-oriented and outward-looking pro-
globalization reforms. Presumably, the cost of withdrawal from NAFTA would be
so great that no political party could succeed in reversing the reforms which
were integral to the NAFTA arrangements. The political ability to reverse the
"reforms" later would be constrained, signifying to those who wish to work for
such reversal that there has been a loss of "sovereignty" in this sense.23
2. Strategic Action bv Governments and NGOs: What I have said so far
suggests reasons why globalization is seen as reducing sovereignty, even
though it increases efficiency, income and wealth, simply because it is felt to be
reducing the ability to exercise certain policy options. This reduced ability is,
however, simply a reflection of the market forces as reflected in the globalization
process. No "conspiracy" or "strategic" behavior by any foreign governments or
23
 Mind you, this is not the same thing as Ulysses chaining himself voluntarily to resist the
sirens; here, he is chaining also others who have no such fear of the sirens.
agents is involved; the country is simply a victim of autonomous, "structural"
developments in the world economy.
But strategic behavior impacting on one's sovereignty also may be an
increasingly important factor in a globalized economy. Thus, the strong nations,
exploiting their increased leverage through globalization, may successfully
impose on the weak ones demands that improve the distribution of gains from
trade and investment in their favour, either bilaterally through aggressive
actions that reflect the increased vulnerability of internationally-integrated weak
nations to such threats (as in the case of the use by the United States of market-
access-closing threats under the Special 301 provisions of its trade legislation
against selected developing countries that do not accept the maximalist US
version of desirable intellectual property protection) or multilaterally (as when
socially-suboptimal, excessive intellectual property protection was demanded
and successfully translated into concessions by the weaker nations in
multilateral trade negotiations at the Uruguay Round which culminated in the
transformation of the GATT into the WTO)24 . In these instances, the weaker
nations are forced into renouncing policy options that are clearly useful in the
pursuit of their interest: the integration in to the world economy and the
dependence brought by it increases the cost to the weaker countries of not
yielding to such demands for the abandonment of their welfare-improving policy
options.
But such strategic behavior also comes today through the proliferating
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), many of which have active
international agendas (aimed at exploiting the leverage implied by the
increased globalization of the world economy through trade, private capital and
DFI flows, foreign aid programs et.al.) , not with a view to shifting economic
On these questions, see my The World Trading System at Risk, op.cit.
advantage in their constituents' favour, but motivated instead by moral
considerations. Today, there is a veritable explosion of NGOs around the world,
even among the developing and the former socialist countries. s But there is
little doubt that, on the international stage, as it impacts on national sovereignty,
the well-financed and organized NGOs of the rich countries, whose
impassioned one-page advertisements in leading newspapers such as The
Financial Times and The New York Times cannot have missed catching your
attention, call the shots. And the efforts of these NGOs are often aimed at the
developing countries: e.g. at Mexico's environmental standards, at India's
Narmada Dam, at Thailand's safety standards, indeed at an increasing number
of issues.
A noteworthy aspect of these NGO efforts at intruding on the sovereignty
of nations in regard to matters which the NGOs are targeting is that it reflects an
enhanced sense of the obligation that we as human beings owe one another,
transcending national borders. In turn, this phenomenon has contributed to an
important shift in the current approach to questions of sovereignty: namely, that
the nation state is no longer accepted by many as necessarily the legitimate and
exclusive arbiter of its citizens' welfare
The sense of transborder moral obligation is of course ancient, long
predating the modern nation state. As John Dunn, the Cambridge political
theorist, has reminded us eloquently in tracing the origins of the notion of a
"human community," and the consequent answer to the question of what human
beings owe one another26 :
25
 Lester Salomon, in a Foreign Affairs (July /August 1994; pp.109-122) article on 'The Rise
of the Nonprofit Sector", calls this the global "associational revolution" and studies the diverse
cultural and political roots of this phenomenon.
26
 Cf. John Dunn, 'The Nation State and Human Community: Life Chances, Obligation and the
Boundaries of Society", King's College, Cambridge, mimeographed. 1993.
...an old answer [to the question of what we owe to others] with deep Greek and Christian
roots, is that there is just one human community, "that great and natural community"
(Locke 1988, Second Treatise, para 128), as John Locke called it, of all human beings as
natural creatures, whose habitat is the whole globe and whose obligations to one another
do not stop at any humanly created -- any artificial -- boundary. Locke had a very powerful
explanation of why this was so, an explanation which tied human obligations immediately
to the purposes of God himself (Dunn 1984). A pale shadow of Locke's conception, with
God tactfully edited out, still lives on in modern secular understandings of human
rights...and, even more diffusely, in anthropocentric interpretations of the collective
ecological imperative to save a habitat for the human species as a whole.
Obligation implies rights. If then transborder obligations to others elsewhere are
accepted, so must the notion that these others have rights which we. are
expected to sustain.
It follows then that the assumption in international relations since the
Treaty of Westphalia, that nation states have exclusive domain over their
subjects such that treatment of these subjects is a matter of domestic
sovereignty and international relations therefore must respect moral pluralism,
is no longer acceptable. As Raymond Plant has put it succinctly27 : "The
principle of cuius regio euius religio may have been central to the Treaty of
Westphalia but the principle of cuius regio, eius jus is not compatible with the
idea that there are basic human rights the moral authority of which crosses
frontiers."
The problem, of course, is that the mere assertion of morality does not
automatically put these NGOs on higher ground. Often, the demands they make
are culture-bound and have no overriding moral force as when
environmentalists in the United States seek to attack Mexico with trade
sanctions for using purse seine nets to catch tuna and killing dolphins in the
process; surely these demands appear to Mexicans to be morally defective in
putting dolphins ahead of the Mexican poor (since purse seine nets are more
productive). Also, Mexicans may well wonder why there is no equivalent
27
 Raymond Plant, "Rights, Rules and World Order", University of Southampton, U.K.,
mimeographed. 1993.
condemnation of equally cruel hog farming or chicken batteries within the
United States itself, suggesting compellingly that there is no morally coherent
approach here to the issue of cruelty to animals and of animal rights.
Often the NGOs, based in the North, also focus on the failings in the
South rather than admitting the commonality of these failings everywhere and
turning the spotlight equally on the moral turpitude in their own backyards. Thus,
for instance, the Labour-standards lobbies have typically used the example of a
deadly fire in a toy factory in Bangkok, Thailand where several women workers
died, unable to use the exit doors which had been closed to prevent theft. But a
similar fire had occurred in North Carolina in a chicken parts plant, with exit
doors closed again to prevent theft, and was a far more serious matter since it
was in the world's richest country. Why not use that example instead or
alongside? Then again, the demands to include a Social Clause in the WTO
has also been couched overwhelmingly in terms of the developing countries
indulging in practices leading to unfair competition rather than focusing on the
universality in practice of the failures in regard to the practices (such as, for
instance, virtual slavery through bonded labour, say in India, and through cruel
abuse of migrant labour, say in the US) chosen to be put in the Clause. Equally,
one fails to see good faith efforts to include within the Clause practices where
some of the developed countries would be more serious culprits (e.g. in regard
to the effective as against the notional right to unionize, the right to worker
representation in management, the treatment of immigrant labour etc.).
The feeling has steadily grown, therefore, among the developing
countries that the morality that many of the NGOs advance to override national
sovereignty via the use of trade and aid sanctions is selective, aimed at the
developing countries rather than universal, is often a mask for protectionist
intentions, and is hypocritical in throwing stones at other countries' glass
houses while building fortresses around one's own.28 The NGOs' efforts are
therefore unlikely to succeed until these fundamental flaws are fixed, as I
optimistically expect that they will eventually as the NGOs mature and their
activities and influence expand.
VI. Globalization and Democracy
The arguments above about the effect of the globalization process on
national sovereignty have an obvious relationship, of course, to the ability of
citizens to participate effectively in the democratic choice of policies within the
nation state.
On the other hand, there is much that is positive for the spread of
democracy in the developing countries when globalization is seen on the
dimension of freer mobility of people and of ideas that goes with greater
integration. The idea of democracy itself has spread through the postwar
period, a role being played in the dramatic turn of the Third World to democracy
by the increased awareness among the peoples there of the institutions of
democracy in the developed world. Trade and investments have drawn the
elites, the bourgeoisie, into deeper contacts with the democracies and have
surely prompted their successful demands for democracy in their own countries.
Also, the quality of democracy has certainly improved with the increased
trade and investments that, alongside the growth of foreign education and the
availability of information through the medium of television (which brings telling
images of individualism, political freedom, liberated women et. al. to vast
audiences via CNN, BBC and other worldwide services), are serving as
28
 I have dealt with these problems in greater depth, in the context of environmental and
labour standards demands at the WTO, in several writings. See, for example, my 1994 Harold
Wincott Lecture, Free Trade. "Fair Trade" and the New Protectionism. Institute for Economic
Affairs, London, April 1995.
catalysts for bringing ever more of the traditionally peripheral groups such as
women increasingly into an assertive, and often a political, role in their own
societies. To give just one telling example: the enormous expansion of
Japanese multinationals in the European Union and in the United States in the
last fifteen years, and the accompanying explosion in the number of corporate
wives and children living in the West, has been a source of cultural change in
the direction of modernizing the elite women (and men) of Japan and
encouraging their inclusion in Japan's strengthening democracy and polity.29 I
can only applaud such outcomes.
29
 I have dealt with this question of Japan's political, economic and cultural evolution and
convergence in "Samurais No More", Foreign Affairs, May/June 1994, in the context of a critique
of the Clinton administration's Japan policy.
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